|
The CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis ((オランダ語:Centraal Planbureau), ''Central Planning Bureau'') is a part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs (Netherlands) and it delivers economic analysis and forecasts. In this process the CPB tries to be scientifically sound and up-to-date. The CPB is an independent Dutch government agency founded at 15 September 1945 by Nobel laureate Jan Tinbergen. On 21 April 1947 it obtained its legal basis. It is located in The Hague. Clients of the CPB are Dutch Cabinet, politicians and political parties, policy makers from ministries, labour unions, employer's organizations, etc. It also provides reports and advice for European Union initiatives. One of the government appointed members in the Social-Economic Council is chair of CPB. ==Status== CPB is financed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, but it is operating independently. This means it does have a stable income but also does not have to follow the ministry. This combination is the foundation for the unique status of the CPB. The CPB is asked to analyze the election platforms of the major parties for the effects of proposed policies on the budget deficit, unemployment, inflation, income differentials, and so forth.〔Faludi A. 2005. “The Netherlands: A Country with a Soft Spot for Planning.” In Comparative Planning Cultures, edited by Sanyal B. 285–307. New York/London: Routledge. (Download )〕 This makes a clear guide for voters because of the following advantages:〔Bos, F. (2007). The Dutch fiscal framework: History, current practice and the role of the CPB. Current Practice and the Role of the CPB, (Available at SSRN )〕 * The same underlying economics base scenario for the next government's term is used to evaluate each election program. This means that differences in the outcomes between the parties cannot be due to diverging assumptions about economic developments. *The political parties have to elaborate and explain their proposals in such a way that the CPB is able to analyze them. This means that the parties cannot (on the basis of unfounded optimism) exaggerate the benefits and/or understate the costs of their proposals. *The policy proposals and their financial consequences are presented in a comparable way. This means that the parties' commitments in the financial and economic sphere can be compared to each other *The CPB systematically investigates the consistency of the programs. In their initial proposals there maybe some "miscalculations", but such issues are invariably resolved in the detailed discussions between the party in question and the CPB. *The CPB only includes in its analysis measures which are expected to be technically and legally feasible. If the CPB does not have the in-house expertise to judge the feasibility or the legality of certain proposals, it obtains advice from other institutions. It is also not uncommon to use the results of the CPB to defend attack or compare the different policies. Parties voluntarily subject their programs to CPB analysis. However, after the elections of 1986 it became a custom that each major party asked the CPB to forecast the consequences of their election program. In general, the parties seem to worry more about being accused of not wanting to face the economic consequences of their proposals than showing negative results. In 2002 the party "List Pim Fortuyn" did not submit their elections platform, although it came in as second largest party.〔Kraan, D. (2005). Typically Dutch. OECD Journal on Budgeting, 4(4), 103-125. (DOI:10.1787/16812336 )〕 The CPB analyzes government budget proposals on its own initiative. The analysis is considered a key document when determining how successful a government is with it policies. The results of this analysis is the basis for the income and expenditure for the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Through the independent status of the CPS it is in practice impossible for the Dutch government to use their own models and interpretations of statistics. This forces the government, regardless of who is in power, to stay within the given boundaries and lowers the chance of budget surprises. It also increases the credibility of the ministry estimates. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
|